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IF YOU’RE READING THIS, IT’S TOO LATE: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NOTICE EFFECTUATING
IMPLIED CONSENT†
ABSTRACT
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment; a search is per
se unreasonable absent a warrant, but if the state has garnered consent from an
individual, the subsequent search is deemed reasonable and not to have violated
the Fourth Amendment. Because consent is a powerful exception, governments
looking to establish valid search schemes are attempting to garner consent,
specifically implied consent, by notifying individuals that specific actions will
serve as consent to search.
Such attempts are not rare. This Comment focuses on three examples: the
Denver Police Department’s use of signs notifying individuals in particular
areas that their biometric data is being gathered, the City of Bristol’s street signs
notifying individuals that parking in public spots serves as consent to search
their vehicles for parking enforcement purposes, and, most famously, implied
consent laws claiming that the issuance of a driver’s license serves as consent
to a breathalyzer test. These examples all illustrate government attempts to use
notice to effectuate implied consent to search.
This Comment argues that this approach to garnering implied consent to
search is largely dishonest, despite the ubiquity of such laws in American
society. The vast majority of attempts to use this approach do not comport with
any definition of consent, especially not implied consent. Further, the Fourth
Amendment’s consent exception requires a number of elements be met before
consent can be satisfied. However, turning to the pervasively regulated
industries exception for inspiration, this Comment proposes a four-element
dispositive test to determine when notice can effectuate implied consent to
search: tradition of search, consistency of search, revocability of consent, and
most importantly, furthering of public safety.

†
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.1 This right “belongs as much to the citizen
on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose
of his secret affairs.”2 “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others.”3
These epic proclamations make clear that no act or interest is too small to
warrant protection under the Fourth Amendment. A recent case from the Sixth
Circuit demonstrates just how far this sentiment goes. In Taylor v. City of
Saginaw,4 the court held that the practice of tire chalking for parking
enforcement purposes constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.5 In the
aftermath of this case, parking enforcement officers subject to the law of the
Sixth Circuit may6 need a warrant prior to chalking a vehicle’s tires.
But in an interesting twist, not long after this decision was handed down,
new signs began popping up on the streets of Bristol, Tennessee,7 a small town

1
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968).
3
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
4
Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that use of chalk to mark tires
to determine how long vehicles had been parked was a “search” within the definition of the Fourth Amendment,
and that the city and officer failed to meet their burden of showing that marking tires fell within exception to
warrant requirement.).
5
See Campbell Robertson, Lose the Chalk, Officer: Court Finds Marking Tires of Parked Cars
Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/tire-chalk-parkingunconstitutional.html.
6
Some scholars are suggesting that this case’s holding is much narrower than initially suspected.
Because the ruling was based on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, some argue that the Court was holding only
that the Plaintiff had in fact stated a plausible claim, and not making any substantive ruling on the
constitutionality of the search. The Sixth Circuit issued an amended opinion in which it states, “we hold that
chalking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, specifically under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones.
This does not mean, however, that chalking violates the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we hold, based on the
pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the ‘community caretaking’
exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this. When
the record in this case moves beyond the pleadings stage, the City is, of course, free to argue anew that one or
both of those exceptions do apply, or that some other exception to the warrant requirement might apply.” Taylor,
922 F.3d at 336.
7
Blake Lipton, New Parking Signs to Notify People About Tire Chalking Come to Downtown Bristol,
TN, WJHL NEWS CHANNEL 11 (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:42 PM), https://www.wjhl.com/news/local/new-parking-signsto-notify-people-about-tire-chalking-come-to-downtown-bristol-tn/.

TOMKOVICZPROOFS_9.30.20

156

9/30/2020 12:09 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:153

within the Sixth Circuit.8 These signs read, “By parking in timed spaces, you
consent to your tires being chalked for parking enforcement.”9 In other words,
after the court held a practice to be a violation of the people’s Fourth
Amendment rights,10 the City of Bristol immediately used its authority to post
signs that served to nullify the court’s decision by claiming to obtain implied
consent from its citizens. This example begs an important question: can the state
turn an unconstitutional search into a constitutional search simply by putting
individuals on notice?
Bristol, Tennessee’s use of signs to imply consent to search is neither the
only nor the most serious attempt by a jurisdiction to do so. The Denver Police
Department uses a surveillance system called the High Activity Location
Observation system, or HALO.11 Employing 256 cameras around the city,12 the
police are constantly monitoring almost every corner of Denver.13 While simply
monitoring a city via pole camera surveillance is a constitutional practice,14 these
cameras can now be combined with other software to cross-reference data they
gather with other systems of biometric data collection and analysis to find people
of interest.15 The Colorado Bureau of Investigations already has plans to
8
Geographical Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts,
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/Circuit%20Map.pdf.
9
Lipton, supra note 7 (quoting language directly from the sign pictured in the article).
10
The court later released a clarification stating that they did not necessarily decide that the practice of
tire chalking was per se unconstitutional, rather that the practice constituted a search. See Orin Kerr, Chalking
Tires and the Fourth Amendment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 23, 2019, 5:49 AM), https://reason.com/2019/04/
23/chalking-tires-and-the-fourth-amendment/.
11
Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, DENVER CHANNEL
(July 9, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/360/facial-recognition-technology-does-itviolate-privacy-or-protect-community-.
12
David Sachs, The Denver Police Essentially Have 256 Sentinel Robots Watching over the Streets, and
Here’s Where You’ll Find Them, DENVERITE (Dec. 21, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://denverite.com/2018/12/21/thedenver-police-essentially-have-256-sentinel-robots-watching-over-the-streets-and-heres-where-youll-findthem/.
13
Id.
14
See United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Thus, notwithstanding the
concurrences in Jones and dicta in our unpublished opinion, the results in Knotts, Forest, and Skinner indicate
that long-term warrantless surveillance via a stationary pole camera does not violate a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights when it was possible for any member of the public to have observed the defendant’s activities
during the surveillance period.”); see also Bob Farb, Pole Camera Surveillance Under the Fourth Amendment,
N.C. CRIM. L. (July 12, 2016, 10:24 AM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/pole-camera-surveillance-fourthamendment/ (“Nothing in Jones or lower court cases after Jones calls into question the use of surveillance
cameras that are focused on public streets, parks, and other public areas. For example, if drug activity is
commonplace at a particular intersection, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude placing a surveillance
camera on a light pole facing that intersection.”).
15
See Const. Project’s Task Force on Facial Recognition Surveillance & Jake Laperruque, Facing the
Future of Surveillance, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.pogo.org/report/2019/03/
facing-the-future-of-surveillance/#heading-8 (last visited Sept. 1, 2020) (“Such data could be used for an
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combine the HALO system with software called Morpho Argus,16 a real-time
video screening system that processes faces captured in live or recorded video,17
to turn the HALO cameras from tools that monitor the public to tools that scan,
collect, and store the biometric data of Denver’s citizens.18 All of this data is
obtained without the express consent of its citizens. However, the city has posted
signs stating, “Attention: This area is monitored by video cameras to enhance
your safety and security.”19
A third example animating the role notice plays in the Fourth Amendment is
classic DUI implied consent laws. These statutes claim to confer consent to
search via breathalyzer (and possibly blood test) through the issuance of a
driver’s license. The statute provides the “notice,” which, combined with the
issuance of the driver’s license, provides law enforcement with your “consent”
to a breathalyzer test, should you be suspected of driving while intoxicated.
While the constitutionality of these schemes has been questioned, they still exist
in all fifty states today.20
These three examples, although spanning the spectrum of technological
sophistication, give rise to important questions about the meaning of implied
consent and the role notice plays in the Fourth Amendment search equation.
Where does the theory of implied consent fit within the Fourth Amendment?21
Is notice alone enough to generate the implied consent to search?

immense array of future government activities, ranging from profiling, to selective law enforcement
investigations, to applications for background checks, to evaluations for civil service employment
opportunities.”).
16
MorphoManager: Centralizing User Database and Biometric Terminal Management, IDEMIA, https://
www.idemia.com/morphomanager (last visited June 28, 2020).
17
Id.
18
Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, supra note 11; cf.
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: BIG
DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, at x (2014). The merging of data systems is drastically
increasing law enforcement capabilities—this phenomenon is referred to as “data fusion.” Id. “Data fusion
occurs when data from different sources are brought into contact and new facts emerge . . . . Individually, each
data source may have a specific, limited purpose. Their combination, however, may uncover new meanings. In
particular, data fusion can result in the identification of individual people, the creation of profiles of an
individual, and the tracking of an individual’s activities. More broadly, data analytics discovers patterns and
correlations in large corpuses of data, using increasingly powerful statistical algorithms. If those data include
personal data, the inferences flowing from data analytics may then be mapped back to inferences, both certain
and uncertain, about individuals.” Id.
19
Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, supra note 11.
20
Robert Voas, Tara Kelley-Baker, Eduardo Romano & Radha Vishnuvajjala, Implied-Consent Laws: A
Review of the Literature and Examination of Current Problems and Related Statutes, 40 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 78
(2009).
21
In a 1991 essay, Stephen Kruger argued that the doctrine of implied consent lacks any constitutional
foundation whatsoever: “Whether the Search Clause should be read with Brennanite expansiveness or
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The answers to these questions have important implications as legislatures
begin creating laws regulating the collection of biometric data, and courts will
undoubtedly begin hearing challenges to these laws almost as soon as they are
enacted. Currently, there is no federal biometric data collection law, and only a
few states have legislation regulating biometric data collection.22 Washington
State is the next in line—Washington’s House of Representatives has drafted a
bill regulating the gathering of biometric data that is currently working its way
through the legislature.23 Before creating these laws, legislatures should have a
concrete understanding of the role implied consent plays in various Fourth
Amendment doctrines, especially if they rely on implied consent rationales to
justify their new laws. As an initial matter, the Fourth Amendment requires law
enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search of a private area.24
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable;25 however, this
presumption can be overcome when an individual gives valid consent, either
express or implied.26
Theories of implied consent permeate two separate exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement: the general consent exception27 and the
pervasively regulated industries exception, housed within the administrative
search doctrine.28 The general consent doctrine of the Fourth Amendment is the
most commonly used exception to the warrant requirement;29 it deems searches
Rehnquistian narrowness is a red herring, because nothing in the writings of the Framers or of their
contemporaries substantiates the implied consent doctrine . . . . Absent original intent and an original
understanding of the Constitution, its protections are illusory. Implied consent finds no anchor in the Constitution
as understood at the time of its ratification. Therefore, the doctrine is Fourth Amendment fakery. Considering
judicial lawlessness, however, it is too much to expect that implied consent will be declared unconstitutional.”
Stephen Kruger, Implied Consent Is Fourth Amendment Fakery, 45 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 45, 45–46 (1991).
22
Biometric Data and Data Protection Regulations (GDPR and CCPA), THALES, (May 12, 2020),
https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/biometric-data.
23
Brian Higgins, Congress, States Introduce New Laws for Facial Recognition, Face Data – Part 2, A.I.
TECH. & L. (Apr. 12, 2019), http://aitechnologylaw.com/2019/04/congress-states-new-laws-facial-recognitionface-date-part2/.
24
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357–58 (1967) (noting that “[s]earches conducted without
warrants have been held unlawful” without an exception, including private areas such as a phonebooth).
25
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 8.2(l) (5th
ed. 2019) (quoting State v. Banks, 434 P.3d 361, 371 (Or. 2019)).
26
See id.
27
Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent
Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005).
28
The administrative search doctrine refers to searches that are usually done for regulatory, as opposed
to criminal investigation, purposes. These include safety inspections, drug testing of employees, and school
searches of children’s purses and are usually not conducted by police officers. JAMES TOMKOVICZ & WELSH
WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 612 (8th ed.
2017).
29
Simmons, supra note 27.
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reasonable once an individual has consented to the search.30 Under this doctrine,
consent can be given either explicitly or implicitly, as long as it meets the
common law requirements.31 The pervasively32 regulated industries exception is
continuing to develop, and courts are still determining the scope and reach of
this exception’s application. It is premised on the notion that because businessowners entering a pervasively regulated industry are on notice of the possibility
of warrantless searches, the act of entering the industry serves as implied consent
to particular searches and, therefore, these searches are reasonable absent a
warrant.33
This Comment draws on philosophical and legal approaches to implied
consent to argue that notice alone is never sufficient to generate implied consent
under the Fourth Amendment. Every formulation of consent used in law requires
an affirmative, communicative act on the part of the consenter. Using notice
alone to attempt to garner implied consent to search, thereby deeming a search
reasonable, does not meet the requirements set forth in any Fourth Amendment
doctrine. However, borrowing from the pervasively regulated industry
exception, only if the government can show the presence of four elements should
it be allowed to rely on implied consent effectuated from notice.
Part I of this Comment evaluates the philosophical foundations of consent.
It does so by looking at both the ontology of consent as well as the elements that
comprise consent. Part II explores applications of implied consent within the
legal realm. Specifically, it reviews applications of various implied consentbased rationales in contract law, sexual assault law, and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on both the general
consent exception and the pervasively regulated industries exception and
analyzes the evolution of the implied consent doctrine in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence specifically. Part III focuses on the role of notice; it addresses the
ambiguous role notice plays in consent theory. First, it provides an example of
courts explicitly rejecting a notice-based implied consent approach in the private

30

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
See LAFAVE, supra note 25; infra Part II.
32
Some scholars use the term “highly” or “closely” regulated industry instead. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking
Closely Regulated Industries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 797, 797 (2016).
33
LAFAVE, supra note 25 (“The Supreme Court has said, for example, by way of justifying official
inspections of the premises where certain types of business enterprises are carried on, that the ‘businessman in
a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.’ This, so the analysis proceeds, is
because when he ‘chooses to engage in [a] pervasively regulated business’ he ‘does so with the knowledge that
his business . . . will be subject to effective inspection.’”) (alterations in original). See generally Rethinking
Closely Regulated Industries, supra note 32 (exploring the exception and arguing in favor of restricting it to
protect customer privacy).
31
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law setting (specifically clickwrap and browsewrap website agreements).
Second, it evaluates the courts’ treatment of notice within the Fourth
Amendment consent and pervasively regulated industries exceptions. Part IV
combines philosophical and legal approaches to implied consent to show why
notice alone should never be sufficient to generate the consent necessary to deem
a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part V of this
comment draws the line by arguing for a four-element approach to determine
when notice can serve to generate implied consent for the purposes of a Fourth
Amendment search.
I.

THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CONSENT: ONTOLOGY
AND ELEMENTS

This section explores the meaning of consent through a philosophical lens.
Sections A and B seek to establish a basic, foundational definition of consent
necessary to understand legal permutations of consent in different areas of law.
A. Philosophical Ontology of Consent
Any meaningful discussion of implied consent must begin with an
understanding of the ontology34 of consent. In the broadest sense, consent theory
is “any political, moral, legal, or social theory that casts society as a collection
of free individuals and then seeks to explain or justify outcomes by appealing to
their voluntary actions.”35 Consent philosophers often use the term “morally
transformative consent,”36 which refers to consent that has made it “permissible
for A to act with respect to B in a way that would be impermissible absent valid
consent.”37 Morally transformative consent is a subset of consent that focuses
on justifying actions between parties. There are three primary approaches to
what constitutes morally transformative consent: psychological phenomenon,
observable behavior, and the hybrid view.38

34
While the term “ontology” can refer to a few distinct aspects of a concept, for the purposes of this
Comment it will refer to “problems about the most general features and relations of the entities which . . . exist.”
Logic and Ontology, STAN. ENCY. PHIL. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/.
35
Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1668 (1990) (book
review).
36
Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid
Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 79, 79 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds.,
2010).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 84.
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Consent as a psychological phenomenon means that “B consents if and only
if she has the relevant mental state.”39 This definition tracks with scholar Heidi
Hurd’s definition of consent as “an act of will—a subjective mental state akin to
other morally and legally significant mens rea.”40 Scholar Peter Westen has
described it as “a state of mind of acquiescence.”41 Ultimately, the psychological
phenomenon approach to consent holds that the only necessary and sufficient
element of valid consent is an individual’s mental state of consent. The
communication of that mental state is an irrelevant inquiry when determining if
one consented under this approach. In other words, regardless of external
manifestations or actions, if one does not possess a mental state of consent to a
particular course of action, she has not consented.
The observable behavior model of consent states that “B consents if and only
if she tokens or expresses consent in a conventionally appropriate way.”42 While
we assume that people act according to their internal beliefs, this approach
dictates that we ought not to inquire into the mental state of the consenter.
Instead, we ought to focus on her behavior alone. In his piece, The Nature of
Consent, John Kleinig defines consent through the logical equation “A
consented (to B) to X,” where A and B are people and X is a course of action for
which A’s authorization, permission, or agreement is required.43 Kleinig argues
that consent is primarily (and most importantly) a communicative act that
“serves to alter the moral relations in which A and B stand—and that for the
moral relations to have been altered for B, a communicative act must have
occurred.”44 Most of the time, one’s expression of consent usually reflects an
internal mental state of consent. However, this theory becomes problematic in
instances of miscommunication, where A may have thought she was consenting
to one act, but due to a misunderstanding (in good or bad faith), she was
perceived as consenting to a different act. In this example, A outwardly
expressed consent, although her mental state was not aligned with that consent.
According to this theory, only communication of consent is necessary and
sufficient. Therefore, in the previous example, A’s expression of consent is
sufficient to establish her morally transformative consent.

39

Id.
Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 (1996).
41
Peter Westen, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A
DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 5 (2004).
42
Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36, at 84.
43
John Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 5–8
(Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (variables altered).
44
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
40
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The mode of the expression, however, can be problematic when seeking to
determine true mental consent. Take silence, for example. In a situation where
silence is deemed to be consent,45 imagine an individual who is not paying
attention and thus does not speak up when necessary; she will be deemed to have
consented. Why? Because it is reasonable for others to act as if the person’s
silence indicated consent.46 This example illustrates one problem inherent in the
observable behavior model. Thus, for some scholars, the answer to such a
problem lies in the hybrid approach: valid consent requires both a mental state
of consent and the appropriate communicative expression of consent.47
The variety of consent definitions already creates some serious issues, or at
least questions, for the theory of implied consent; the differences between these
definitions have important implications for implied consent. Under Kleinig’s
theory, if consent rests exclusively on the mental state being communicated,
implied consent is a particularly weak theory because valid consent requires
some form of expression of consent, which arguably transforms it from implied
to express consent. However, if consent is a subjective mental state, the theory
of implied consent is more justifiable, since consent happens inside one’s mind
and does not need to be communicated to be “real.” And yet, if consent permits
others to act differently toward us, outward expressions perceived by those
others arguably ought to be a necessary predicate.
B. Philosophical Elements of Consent
The ontology of consent is a different issue than the elements that comprise
consent. John Kleinig’s approach in The Nature of Consent provides four
necessary elements of consent: competence, voluntariness, knowledge, and
intention.48 As Don Herzog explains, “Since consent theory explains moral
obligations by specifying what the individual has voluntarily
chosen . . . obstacles to voluntary choice, if inexorable, will compromise the
usefulness of consent theory as a descriptive map and normative guide.”49 Two
points emerge from this excerpt. First, consent is based on voluntary choice.
Second, the meaning of consent is seriously compromised, even destroyed, when
individuals lose, or never had, the ability to make a voluntary choice in the first
place. One cannot justify an action through consent if a voluntary choice was
never made. Voluntariness is the philosophical bedrock of consent.
45
46
47
48
49

For example, if someone says, “Speak now if you do not consent.”
Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36, at 85.
Id. at 84.
Kleinig, supra note 43, at 13–20.
Herzog, supra note 35, at 1674.
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Implied consent works well to explain how an individual moves through the
world on her own—we do not question the voluntariness of most of her daily
actions; rather, we simply assume she is voluntarily acting and doing exactly as
she pleases. However, implied consent becomes more complicated when we use
it to explain interactions between two parties, especially two parties at arm’s
length, like a citizen and a law enforcement agent. Without express consent, it
can require a bit more work to ensure that an encounter was consensual. The use
of this theory is further complicated when there is an unequal power dynamic
between the two interacting parties, as exists between an individual and the state.
Philosophy provides an important foundational understanding of consent
and its elements. As consent theory, particularly implied consent, is
operationalized in various areas of law, this foundational framework is tweaked
and augmented in important ways.
II. IMPLIED CONSENT IN VARIOUS AREAS OF LAW
Theories of implied consent play a role in various fields of law, both civil
and criminal. The fundamental framework in which we approach consent varies
drastically between civil and criminal law.50 “[I]n the criminal law, ‘legal
consent’ may be a mental state, whereas in torts or contracts ‘legal consent’ may
be . . . performative.”51 In fact, criminal law, “at its boldest, almost pretends to
judge a suspect’s thoughts.”52 In an effort to better understand the conceptual
framework of implied consent, it is worth briefly analyzing how different areas
of law, specifically contract, sexual assault law, and the Fourth Amendment,
approach and justify this theory.
A. Implied Consent in Contract Law
The area of law that arguably leans most heavily on consent is contract law.
The fundamental assumption of a contract, and the assumption most relevant to
its validity, is that both parties consented, or agreed, to its terms.53 For centuries,
contract law has used a theory of implied consent, referred to as “implied-in50
Tom Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Justification, 61 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 17, 24 (2010) (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 042: Consent, LEGAL THEORY
LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/11/legal_theory_le.html (last updated Jan. 19,
2020)).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (2020) (“The merit of these definitions is that they
acknowledge that a contract establishes a relationship among the contracting parties that goes well beyond their
express promises.”).
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fact” and “implied-in-law,” to fill gaps where contracts lack express consent.54
These gap-fillers are justified on principle and policy rather than on the true
consent of the parties.55 In fact, gap-filling only takes place when parties have
not expressly manifested agreement to the terms of a contract. “Implied-in-fact”
refers to terms or creation of a contract that can be gleaned from a person’s
behavior.56 Based on one party’s behavior, another party performs a service
without being verbally asked to do so, and expects payment (or some other form
of consideration).57 The prime example is the act of ordering food at a restaurant
creating a contract for payment. No contract is signed, and no terms are
discussed, but a contract has been created implicitly.
Some scholars suggest that a more accurate conceptualization of implied
consent in contract law is a “default” rules model, as opposed to an “implied”
rules model when filling gaps in contracts.58 As scholar Randy Barnett argues,
because contracts are grounded in the parties’ manifestation of their intent to be
legally bound, they have actually consented, in the broadest sense, to a set of
default rules. He analogizes default rules to the setting of a word processing
program—while we do not explicitly set our margins and font each time we open
a document, we consent to the settings, unless we manually override them.59 In
certain contexts, rather than looking to justify ubiquitous contract terms via
implied consent, it is more accurate to treat these terms as default rules that one
must opt out of, as opposed to opt in to. The notion that these gap-fillers are so
much a part of contract law as to be considered “default rules” demonstrates how
inseparable the theory of implied consent is from contract law.
B. Implied Consent in Sexual Assault Law
Consent plays a notorious, oft critiqued, and particularly nebulous role in
sexual relations and rape law. Superficially, one might say that the law
criminalizes nonconsensual sex and allows consensual sex; but this is highly
simplified and fails to account for the gradations within the meaning of consent.
Over time, as feminist theory has developed, scholars have taken a closer, more

54
Willard L. Boyd III & Robert K. Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-Fact
Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 606–09 (1991).
55
Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822
(1992); Brian Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 251, 261 (Franklin Miller &
Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
56
Bix, supra note 55.
57
Quasi Contract, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER L. DICTIONARY (2012).
58
Barnett, supra note 55.
59
Id. at 824.
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nuanced look at what consent to sex actually means. Coercion, competency,
deception, and intoxication can complicate the consent inquiry.60
Society has come a long way in its understanding of consent, particularly
implied consent, within rape law. Common law theories of consent offered wide
latitude to imply consent from behavior, largely based on the idea that women
were either apathetic toward sex or embarrassed by their desires for sex; they
therefore needed to be forced into the act to overcome these obstacles.61 Of
course, women have also traditionally been viewed as an inferior population,
their free will being both dominated and overridden by men.62 These misguided
rationales led courts to find implied consent based on many “normal” female
behaviors. Some judges were not looking for actual verbal consent, but rather
behavior that signaled sexual availability.63
The tides have certainly turned in this regard. The idea that sexually
promiscuous behavior (or even normal behavior) somehow implies that one is
consenting to sexual relations with whomever one encounters now seems
ludicrous,64 and the law largely reflects such. Canada has gone so far as to
explicitly hold that “[n]o defense of implied consent to sexual assault exists in
Canadian law.”65

60
See Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 195, 204–17 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
61
Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent
Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 67 (1952) (“A woman’s need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the unconscious
desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid the guilt feelings which might occur after
willing participation.”); see also BYRON, DON JUAN, Canto I, stanza 117 (Marchand ed., 1958) (“A little still she
strove, and much repented / And whispering, ‘I will ne’er consent,’—consented.”).
62
See, e.g., Muller v. State of Oregon 208 U.S. 412, 421–422 (1908) (“Still again, history discloses the
fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. . . . [B]ut looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort
to maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality. . . . It is impossible to close one’s eyes
to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him.”); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141
(1872) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”).
63
See State v. Myers, 606 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1980) (overruling trial judge’s arrest of judgment where
rape based upon a victim’s “friendly” behavior when judge stated that “if under those facts and circumstances a
man has sexual intercourse with a woman, it seems to me, even if it can technically be said without her consent,
I don’t think that we can, in any sense of the word, justify imposing a prison sentence upon him on that fact
situation”).
64
See Lindsay Bever, The Persistent Myth That Revealing Clothing Leads to Rape, WASH. POST (Jan. 10,
2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/10/the-persistent-myththat-revealing-clothing-leads-to-rape/.
65
R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.).
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Nonetheless, the theory of implied consent is still used today to justify the
marital rape exemption.66 This exemption can be traced to ancient biblical
ideology of women as property and marriage as a contract.67 “The husband
cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”68 Because sexual intercourse
within a marriage was assumed to be consensual and irrevocable,69 intramarital
rape could not occur.70 While this understanding of implied consent is
inconsistent with nearly every other conception of consent within criminal law,71
the marital rape exemption persists in at least a dozen states.72
It is difficult to comprehensively survey consent in sexual assault law
because of the variety of statutes and approaches throughout the states.
Culturally, there seems to be a movement toward stricter conceptions of consent,
but criminal law has not necessarily tracked this evolution. While at least three
states have affirmative consent laws,73 the definition of consent, and thus of
implied consent, in sexual assault law is inconsistent. In some jurisdictions, a

66
But see SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 435 (2017). Recent statutory reforms have substantially eroded this exception. Id.
67
See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE, 380 (1st ed. 1975). The
exemption of husbands from rape prosecutions can be traced to our biblical forefathers’ interpretation of the
definition of rape. Any carnal knowledge outside the marriage contract was deemed unlawful, while any carnal
knowledge within the marriage contract was considered lawful. See also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,
361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (“This rule [for coverture laws] has worked out in reality to mean that though
the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband.”).
68
1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (photo. reprint 2003) (E. & R.
Nutt & R. Gosling 1736) (spelling updated).
69
But see Theresa Fus, Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legislative
Approaches, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 481, 483 (“Variations on Hale’s strict irrevocability principle allow
for a wife to revoke her implied sexual consent only in times when ‘ordinary relations’ in the marriage are
suspended. For example, a woman can revoke her implied consent when she and her husband are separated.”).
70
Anne L. Buckborough, Family Law: Recent Developments in the Law of Marital Rape, 1989 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 343, 345–46 (1990) (“According to the theory of implied consent, marital rape is impossible
because all sexual contact within a continuing relationship is presumed to be consensual. . . . Thus, under statutes
grounded in the theory of implied consent, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is not a crime in the context of an
ongoing sexual relationship.”).
71
See Lalenya Siegel, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351,
354 (1995).
72
Briana Bierschbach, This Woman Fought to End Minnesota’s “Marital Rape” Exception, and Won,
NPR (May 4, 2019, 7:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/04/719635969/this-woman-fought-to-endminnesotas-marital-rape-exception-and-won (“Roughly a dozen states shield a spouse from prosecution in a rape
case, including South Carolina, where a married victim has to prove a threat of physical violence within 30 days
of the rape. Ohio lawmakers are also debating removing a marital rape exception on their law books.”).
73
Jocelyn Noveck, In Defining Consent, There’s a Gap Between the Law, Culture, CLAIMS J. (May 21,
2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2019/05/21/291029.htm.
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lack of force suggests the victim did not resist and thus, consented.74 In the
absence of affirmative consent, consent is implied through silence or lack of
resistance—a clear example of consent being implied in the absence of
affirmative consent. This conception of consent most closely reflects the
“psychological phenomenon” approach.75 Although there is no communication
of consent, behavior is used to assume a mental state of consent exists.
C. Implied Consent under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
The text of the Fourth Amendment provides the people the right to be
“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”76 Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment.77 Warrantless searches are unreasonable unless they fall under an
exception to the warrant requirement.78 Rationales rooted in implied consent
permeate both the general consent exception and the pervasively regulated
industries exception.
These exceptions have developed over time, but the role of implied consent
remains ambiguous in application. Classic implied consent DUI laws, for
example, are justified on a theory of, not surprisingly, implied consent. Although
the precise laws differ from state to state, these statutes generally specify that a
citizen, upon obtaining her driver’s license or driving on public roadways, has
consented to a breathalyzer test (and sometimes a blood test) if pulled over by
law enforcement and suspected of driving under the influence.79 These laws are
discussed in more detail later.80 Before addressing the controversy around
implied consent laws, it is necessary to first understand the court’s jurisprudence
concerning its approach to the general consent exception.
1. The General Consent Exception
The Fourth Amendment generally requires that law enforcement officers
74
Patricia Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 44 (1997) (“Without proof
of force, actual or constructive, evidenced by words or conduct of the defendant . . . , sexual intercourse is not
rape. This is so even though the intercourse may have occurred without the actual consent and against the actual
will of the alleged victim.” (quoting Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219–20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979))).
75
Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36.
76
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
78
Id.
79
Implied Consent Laws, IMPLIEDCONSENT.ORG, http://www.impliedconsent.org/impliedconsentlaws.
html (“When you signed forms to apply for a driver’s license, you agreed to comply with requests by law
enforcement officers to take chemical testing to determine your blood-alcohol content (BAC).”).
80
See infra Part II.C.1.e.

TOMKOVICZPROOFS_9.30.20

168

9/30/2020 12:09 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:153

obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search of private property.81 However,
because the Fourth Amendment only guarantees freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, searches deemed reasonable do not trigger the Fourth
Amendment.82 One type of reasonable search is a consent-based search.83 In
other words, once an officer obtains valid consent to search, the subsequent
search is reasonable and thus in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. But
ascertaining the meaning of valid consent is a complicated inquiry.
Traditionally, courts analyze four factors to determine if officers obtained valid
consent: indication, authority, voluntariness, and scope. While all of these
factors are relevant to determining if an individual gave consent, the evaluation
of each factor is slightly more complicated if a search is justified on implied,
rather than express, consent.
a. Indication
The first factor, indication, is a key component differentiating consent from
implied consent. Generally, courts are looking for any act communicating
consent—an affirmative statement or a shrug could both qualify.84 Requiring
indication of some sort fits with the philosophical conception of consent that
requires a communicative act. Indication plays a key role in morally
transformative consent according to the behavioral model;85 it is necessary to

81

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Id. at 361.
83
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is equally well settled that one of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent.”).
84
See, e.g., United States v. Faler, 832 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding “implied consent” where
the officer asked, “mind if we come in?” and the apartment tenant “opened the door wider, moved out of the
way, and then officers entered”); Wallace v. State, 62 A.3d 1192, 1195 (Del. 2012) (finding that the person who
answered the door upon announcement of “probation and parole” had “opened the front door of the home wide
enough to be considered an implied invitation to enter”); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.
2010) (finding that where the defendant, arrested on front porch, asked to be allowed to enter the house to put
on more appropriate clothing, and officer said she could not enter unless he accompanied her, her subsequent
entry constituted “implied consent” for officer to enter); Brown v. United States, 983 A.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C.
2009) (finding that although the defendant “did not give explicit, verbal permission, she nonetheless impliedly
consented to the search by handing the bottle to” the officer “in response to a question about whether she had
any ‘guns, drugs, or narcotics’”); Brown v. State, 856 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (using the
concept of “implied consent” to conclude that a homeowner who calls the police to a murder scene and asserts
a crime was committed by a third party may be deemed to have allowed the police to enter for purposes of “a
search of the premises reasonably related to the routine investigation of the offense”). The concurring opinion
in Brown v. State helpfully notes that in lieu of the fiction of implied consent, it would be better to say that what
is needed is “the actual consent of the owner, express or implied.” 856 S.W.2d at 184 (McCormick, J.,
concurring).
85
Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36.
82
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satisfy half of the equation in the hybrid model, which conditions valid consent
on both the indication of consent and the mental state of consent.
In the context of implied consent, indication is almost always given in the
form of an act. Words and assertive behavior (such as a nod or gesture) serve as
express indication, whereas taking an action (like parking one’s car, obtaining a
driver’s license, or walking on public streets) can only serve as implied
indication in certain situations. For example, to return briefly to Bristol’s street
signs, if challenged in court, the government would likely argue that in light of
the posted signs, the act of parking one’s car is the indication of consent.
Although no words are exchanged or affirmative acknowledgements given, the
act alone is enough to indicate consent.
However, there are serious concerns with this approach to indication of
implied consent.86 The primary concern is illustrated by the individual who fails
to notice the posted sign. Tying indication of consent to an action assumes that
the individual is aware of the consent associated with her action in a particular
scenario. The government is resting on the assumption that an individual sees
the parking sign on the Bristol streets; or, in the case of the Denver monitoring
signs, assumes the individual notices the sign making her aware of the data
collection. In the case of DUI implied consent laws, the government is assuming
an individual is aware of the statute. The fallacy of this approach lies in these
incorrect assumptions—absent actual awareness of the notice, one’s behavior
does not indicate consent.

b. Authority
The second factor, authority, requires that valid consent be obtained either
from someone who had the actual authority to consent to the search,87 or who
the police reasonably believed had the authority to consent.88 Consent can be
86
See LAFAVE, supra note 25, at § 8.2(g) (“While . . . cooperative action in connection with the search
itself may be a factor appropriately cited by a court to add strength to the conclusion that a particular consent
was voluntary when no highly coercive elements are present, or even when the issue is what interpretation is to
be given to an ambiguous or equivocal response to a police request for consent, there will be other situations in
which it is not a useful indicator of consent.”).
87
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169–70 (1974) (noting that the police can obtain consent for a
search from a third party if that third party has common authority over the premises).
88
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding that a warrantless search does not violate the
Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the
authority to do so). There is a major implication of the shift from relinquishment theory to reasonable search
theory. A search justified on apparent authority, as established in Rodriguez, does not rest on the target’s
relinquishment of her expectation of privacy. In fact, by definition, the target has not relinquished any privacy
expectation. Rather, the justification is that if the police acted reasonably in believing that the consenter had the
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obtained “either from the individual whose property is searched . . . or from a
third party who possesses common authority over the premises.”89 Common
authority rests “on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes.”90 The Court has justified this approach on
an assumption of the risk theory. In other words, when we expose and share our
space with someone else, we assume the risk that they will allow others,
including police officers, into our shared space, thereby exposing it to the public.
With the explosion of social networking and apps gathering users’ personal
information, authority as it pertains to the third-party doctrine is a hot topic
amongst Fourth Amendment scholars.
The controversy stems from a fundamental change in how, where, and with
whom people share their personal data.91 Social networking websites and apps
like Facebook and TikTok gather and store users’ data. This website or app now
owns the data and can consent to its release. The massive expansion in the use
of these apps, combined with the highly personal data being shared, raises
questions about the efficacy of the third-party search doctrine92 in our highly
integrated world. Regardless of who can authorize consent, that consent must be
given voluntarily.
c. Voluntariness
The third factor, voluntariness, requires that valid consent be obtained
voluntarily. The seminal case analyzing voluntariness is Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.93 In Bustamonte, officers obtained consent to search a vehicle,
which contained stolen checks.94 The officers asked the occupants if they could
search the glove compartment, to which one of the occupants responded, “Sure,
go ahead.”95 The state filed charges after the search uncovered stolen checks in
the defendant’s glove compartment.96 The defendant moved to suppress the
authority to consent to the search (although she did not, in fact, have such authority), there is no behavior to
deter and therefore no reason to suppress the evidence gathered during the search.
89
Id. at 181.
90
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
91
See Lisa Schmidt, Social Networking and the Fourth Amendment: Location Tracking on Facebook,
Twitter and Foursquare, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 524 (2012).
92
See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (officially adopting the third-party
search doctrine, stating “this Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”). For a more recent and robust discussion of this
doctrine, see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
93
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
94
Id. at 220.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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checks, arguing that the consent was not valid because he was not notified of his
right to refuse to consent to the search.97 The issue before the Supreme Court
was whether consent is voluntary if given without the police notifying the
consenter of her right to refuse.98
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the state need
not prove that the consenter knew she had the right to refuse in order for consent
to be deemed voluntary.99 It instead relied on the “traditional” definition of
consent,100 which does not require proof of knowledge that one can refuse to
consent. Voluntariness, in the Court’s eyes, can only be determined by looking
at the “totality of the circumstances”101:
While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken
into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the
sine qua non of an effective consent. As with police questioning, two
competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the
meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the legitimate need for such
searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the
absence of coercion.102

Bustamonte holds that voluntariness of consent requires individual inquiries into
the particular set of circumstances surrounding consent.103 The court should look
to both characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.104
The 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States clarified what it means to act
voluntarily in a world inundated with technology.105 Although in the context of
the third-party doctrine, the Court in Carpenter rejected the notion that using a

97

Id. at 219.
Id. at 222.
99
Id. at 248–49.
100
Id. at 225–26 (“The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in AngloAmerican courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it
is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.”).
101
Id. at 227.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 226. Characteristics of the accused include age, education, intelligence, level of intoxication,
cognitive deficits, experience with the justice system, and knowledge of the right to refuse. Id. Characteristics
of the encounter include the number of officers present, their attitude toward the target, the issuance of threats,
the presence of weapons, whether they advised target of her right to leave, time of detention, and whether they
falsely claimed they had a warrant. Id.
105
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
98
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cell phone and thereby subjecting oneself to constant tracking106 is truly
voluntary for two reasons:
In the first place, cell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is
indispensable to participation in modern society. Second, a cell phone
logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative
act on the part of the user beyond powering up.107

Because cell phones are so necessary to modern life and because the generation
of location information is not based on any affirmative action of the cell phone
owner,108 the data is not generated “voluntarily” in any meaningful sense.
d. Scope
The last factor in the analysis concerns the scope of the search. The consenter
has control over the scope of the search to which she consents, and a consentbased search is only valid if it does not exceed the scope to which the consenter
agreed. However, the Court has again relied on a reasonableness standard when
questions of scope arise. In Florida v. Jimeno, an officer pulled over Enio
Jimeno and informed him that he believed there were drugs in Jimeno’s
vehicle.109 Jimeno consented to a search of his vehicle, which turned up a small
paper bag which contained cocaine.110 At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent
did not extend to the bag found within his car.111 The Supreme Court disagreed
and held that the Fourth Amendment is “satisfied when, under the
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the
scope of the suspect’s consent permitted him to open a particular container”112
within the automobile. The Court relied heavily on the fact that the officer had
informed the consenter of his intent to search for drugs. “We think it was
objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to
106
Cell phones continuously track location by sending signals to the nearest cell phone tower at various
times. Id. at 2210. Signals are sent whenever a user uses her phone, but also when a call or text is received, and
at random by the cell phone company. Id. The precision of the user’s GPS location depends on the density of
the towers in a given city. This historical data can be gathered and essentially creates a map of the user’s
movement, wherever he she goes. Id.
107
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
108
This important rationale distinguishes Carpenter from Smith v. Maryland. 442 U. S. 735, 744 (1979).
In Smith, because information was only gathered when the defendant placed a call, he “voluntarily conveyed”
the dialed numbers to the phone company by “expos[ing] that information to its equipment in the ordinary course
of business.” Id.
109
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991).
110
Id. at 249–50.
111
Id. at 250.
112
Id. at 248.
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search respondent’s car included consent to search containers within that car
which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that
narcotics are generally carried in . . . a container.”113
The scope of consent was addressed again twenty-two years after Jimeno in
Florida v. Jardines,114 which specifically looked at the scope of an implied
license. In this case, two officers and a trained police dog approached the
defendant’s front door, without a warrant, on a tip regarding marijuana growth
inside the home.115 After sniffing around the defendant’s front porch, the dog
detected an odor, and based on this information, the detectives received a
warrant to search the home.116 At trial, the judge suppressed the evidence on the
grounds that the canine search was an unreasonable search.117 The Supreme
Court granted cert on the question of “whether the officers’ behavior was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”118
The Court held that the officers’ behavior was an unconstitutional search
under the Fourth Amendment.119 In coming to this conclusion, the Court
analyzed whether the defendant “had given his leave (even implicitly)” for them
to approach.120 The answer turns on the implied social license, which stems from
a theory of implied consent.121 As the Court explained, there are certain signs—
for example, a knocker on a door—that invite specific actions from the public.122
In these situations, explicit consent to engage in the invited behavior is not
necessary because these practices are so woven into society that we assume
everyone is aware of their meaning. However, implied licenses are still limited:
“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular
area but also to a specific purpose.”123 Because Jardines involved the approach
to a house for criminal investigation purposes, the Court found the officers acted
outside the bounds of the implied social license, and thus, there was no consent,
and the search was unconstitutional.
113

Id. at 251.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
115
Id. at 3–4.
116
Id. at 4.
117
Id. at 4–5.
118
Id. at 3.
119
Id. at 11–12.
120
Id. at 8.
121
Id. (“A license may be implied from the habits of the country.” (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S.
127, 135 (1922))).
122
Id. (“This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the
terms of that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal knowledge.”).
123
Id. at 9.
114
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Implied licenses raise important questions about the revocability of the
implied consent to engage in the invited behavior. Based on the Jardines Court’s
justification for the implied license, an individual who does not wish to grant a
license could presumably revoke it.124 However, courts are split on the extent to
which citizens must make clear their efforts to revoke implied licenses. There is
contradictory authority as to the validity and efficacy of the most common means
of keeping people off one’s property: the “No Trespassing” sign.125 Because
consent is only valid as to the scope set by the consenter, it must be revoked to
be valid. This fact has important implications when analyzing the role of notice,
since a sign conferring consent often offers no possibility of revocation.
Additionally, the implied license rests on the assumption that everyone is invited
to perform the specific act that the implied license permits. That is to say, there
could not be an implied license that extends to or limits only law enforcement
officers.
e. Implied Consent Laws in the DUI Context
Traditional implied consent laws rest on shaky Fourth Amendment footing.
Courts have struggled with the constitutionality of implied consent statutes
seeking to ensure public safety by curtailing drunk driving. These laws differ
from state to state, but most condition the receipt of a driver’s license on an
individual’s preemptive consent to a breath and blood test when pulled over on
suspicion of driving while intoxicated.126 The state statute serves to provide

124
For example, a “No Trespassing” sign could function as notice to the public that this specific person
has revoked the otherwise implied license to approach one’s house for certain purposes.
125
See United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 996 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that multiple “No
Trespassing” signs including a sign stating “Posted Private Property Hunting, Fishing, Trapping or Trespassing
for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators Will Be Prosecuted” was not an unambiguous and clear
revocation of the implied license to approach and thus, an objective officer would not have understood that the
implied license he would ordinarily have to approach the porch and knock on the front door of a home had been
revoked at this house); United States v. Jones, No. 4:13cr00011–003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *5 (W.D. Va. Aug.
30, 2013) (holding, post-Jardines, that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering rural property,
driving past “No Trespassing” signs on either side of the driveway, passing another sign on their way to the
house and another affixed to the house, and walking past a “No Trespassing” sign hanging to the right of the
front door in order to conduct a knock-and-talk). But see United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1270
(M.D. Fla. 2015) (“However, it may be inferred from these cases that the combination of posting a ‘No
Trespassing’ sign along with the physical act of closing the gate does serve to seal the property and manifest the
resident’s intent to revoke the implied license to enter.”). See generally, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Stephen
E. Henderson, LAWn Signs: A Fourth Amendment for Constitutional Curmudgeons, 13 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 487
(2016).
126
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (2016) (“They provided that cooperation with BAC
testing was a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads and that the privilege would be rescinded if a
suspected drunk driver refused to honor that condition.”).
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notice of an individual’s consent.127 Essentially, drivers must “consent” to a
potential future breath and blood test at the time they receive their license.128 As
the court’s consent doctrine dictates, valid consent must be indicated by
someone with actual or apparent authority, and voluntarily given, based on a
totality of the circumstances. It is dishonest to suggest that an application of the
classic consent doctrine would render these “consents” valid. It cannot be said
that every person with a driver’s license has truly consented to an unknown
search potentially years or decades before it happens.129 Instead, legislatures
have justified these laws under the theory of implied consent.
The Supreme Court’s DUI implied consent law jurisprudence suggests an
unwillingness to engage with these laws on consent exception grounds. In the
three most recent Supreme Court cases implicating these laws with respect to
the Fourth Amendment, the Court has chosen to justify warrantless roadside
breath and blood tests using either the exigent circumstances doctrine or the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.130 This may be because, despite their name,
implied consent laws are theoretically and analytically distinct from the notion
of consent, so much so that it may strain credulity to suggest that these laws
create any meaningful consent at all.
Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently
asserted their skepticism of implied consent laws in Mitchell v. Wisconsin.131 In
her dissent, Justice Sotomayor rejected the consent rationale that was argued by
the state but rejected by the plurality: “The plurality does not rely on the consent
exception here. With that sliver of the plurality’s reasoning I agree. I would go
further and hold that the state statute, however phrased, cannot itself create the
actual and informed consent that the Fourth Amendment requires.”132 During

127

Implied Consent Laws, supra note 79.
Id.
129
Douglas Husak refers to this concept as “hypothetical consent” and argues that it is impossible to give
consent non-contemporaneously with the act to which you are consenting. Douglas Husak, Paternalism and
Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 107, 113–15 (Franklin Miller & Alan Wertheimer
eds., 2010).
130
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (holding that a breath test, but not blood test, can be administered as
a search incident to arrest for drunk driving); Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2539 (2019) (holding that
in almost all situations, when the police have probable cause to believe a person had committed a drunk-driving
offense and the driver’s unconsciousness required him to be taken to the hospital before the police had a
reasonable opportunity to administer a breath test, they can order a warrantless blood test); Missouri v. McNeely,
569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013) (holding that a warrantless roadside blood test is not categorically constitutional, but
the exigency justification must be determined on a case by case basis).
131
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2541.
132
Id. at 2545.
128
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oral arguments for this case, Justice Ginsburg also rejected the idea that implied
consent is based on real consent:
But it’s a fiction, isn’t it? It’s not consent, no matter how much you
call it implied or presumed. And it’s typical of the original nonresident motor vehicle statutes. They said, if you drive on our roads,
then you will be deemed to have consented to appoint a secretary of
state as your agent, and in time, we came to appreciate that that is not
genuine.133

The majority did not address the theoretical underpinnings of implied consent
laws, but its unwillingness to answer the question on which they granted cert134
suggests discomfort with the notion, or inability to justify, that implied consent
laws are based on a meaningful definition of consent.
2. The Administrative Search Doctrine and Pervasively Regulated
Industries Exceptions
Although less obvious, the theory of implied consent is foundational to
another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement—the closely
regulated industry exception under the administrative search exception.135 This
prong of Fourth Amendment analysis has largely escaped scrutiny. The
administrative search doctrine, first formulated a half-century ago, justifies
broad searches for safety purposes of schools, businesses, government
employees, and more.136 This doctrine is justified on the government’s need to
ensure compliance with laws and regulations through inspection,137 and it allows
warrants to be issued based not on probable cause, but lower legislative or
regulatory standards.138
The pervasively regulated industries exception is an exception to the
administrative search doctrine. This exception allows law enforcement to
inspect businesses in certain industries, under certain conditions, absent a

133

Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2542–43 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court granted certiorari to decide
whether a statute like Wisconsin’s, which allows police to draw blood from an unconscious drunk-driving
suspect, provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”).
135
See Eve Brensike Primus, Bringing Clarity to Administrative Search Doctrine: Distinguishing
Dragnets from Special Subpopulation Searches, 39 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 61 (2012).
136
G. S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2018).
137
Id. (“The administrative search exception permits government officials, to perform this duty without
having to seek warrants for every inspection of business records or premises, increasing efficiency and allowing
the government to promote regulatory compliance, consumer protection, and public safety.”).
138
Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 538–39 (1967).
134
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warrant.139 Courts have accepted Congress’s broad power to design inspection
schemes deemed necessary to ensure safety of certain industries.140 This
exception warrants analysis when looking at justifications of theories of implied
consent because it turns on the notion that business-owners entering pervasively
regulated industries are aware of the regulations in place, and thus implicitly
consent to warrantless inspections simply by entering the industry.141 This
doctrine also assumes that searching a commercial property results in a lesser
intrusion of privacy than searching a home, and that the government has a strong
interest in conducting the search, usually on public safety grounds.142
The historical evolution of this doctrine illustrates why the Court has carved
out this exception to the warrant requirement. The 1972 case of United States v.
Biswell143 established the doctrine and crafted its first iteration. The Court
upheld the constitutionality of a statute authorizing law enforcement to enter and
search businesses in the firearms industry.144 The Biswell Court held that where
“regulatory inspections further urgent federal interests, and the possibility of
abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection
may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute.”145
While Biswell created this exception, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.146 and
Donovan v. Dewey147 set its scope. In Barlow’s, the Supreme Court held that the
warrantless inspection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act) at issue in this case were unconstitutional.148 These provisions
allowed warrantless searches of any employment facility under Occupational
Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) jurisdiction.149 The Court found the
OSH Act provision far too broad to fit within the rationales on which this
exception rests. Specifically, the Court pointed to a notice and implied-consent

139

Rethinking Closely Regulated Industries, supra note 32.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970).
141
Rethinking Closely Regulated Industries, supra note 32, at 803.
142
Id. at 797–98.
143
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
144
Id. at 317.
145
Id. Notably, the Court explicitly distinguished between the exception it was creating and the consent
exception: “In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time,
place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.” Id. at
315.
146
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
147
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
148
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 307.
149
Id. at 309. (“Section 8 (a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 . . . empowers agents of
the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to search the work area of any employment facility within the Act’s
jurisdiction.”).
140
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rationale to justify this exception in only a limited subset of industries: “when
an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to
subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.”150 The Barlow’s
Court required a history of distinctive regulation in a particular industry for this
exception to apply: the history of regulation provides the necessary notice.
Essentially, the Court reiterated that notice is a key element of this exception:
business-owners are aware that entering a certain industry will subject them to
warrantless inspections.151 Where an inspection scheme is too broad and
unparticular, business-owners cannot truly be on notice that they will be subject
to its terms.152 Therefore, the act of entering any industry cannot really serve as
“consent.”153 But just three years later, in Donovan v. Dewey, the Court
weakened this rationale.154 While the Court did not eliminate history of
regulation as a factor, the Court transformed it from a requirement to a nondispositive factor. Warrantless searches could still be upheld under this
exception, but only if Congress’s inspection regime “establishes a predictable
and guided federal regulatory presence.”155 In other words, after Dewey,
predictability was the key inquiry, and a history of industry regulation that put
business-owners on notice of potential warrantless searches was one way to
show the inspection was predictable.156 History of regulation was no longer
required to justify a search under the pervasively regulated industry exception;
it was simply part of the analysis.157
Fifteen years later, in New York v. Burger,158 the Court expounded the
requirements that must be met in order for a search to qualify as reasonable, and
thus fall within this exception.159 It articulated three factors.160 First, the search
regime must advance a substantial government interest.161 Second, the search
must be a necessary component of the regulatory scheme.162 Third, the

150
Id. at 313; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) (“[B]usinessmen
engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their
trade . . . [and] in effect consent[] to the restrictions placed upon [them].”).
151
Barlow’s, 436 U.S. at 313.
152
See id.
153
Id. at 313–14.
154
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 605–06 (1981).
155
Id. at 603–04.
156
Id. at 606.
157
Id. at 605–06.
158
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
159
Id. at 691–92.
160
Id. at 702.
161
Id.
162
Id.
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inspection program must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant by providing notice to the owner and must limit police discretion.163 The
Burger Court believed notice played an important role in determining whether a
warrantless search is reasonable, even when a statutory scheme allowing such
inspection is in place.
Burger was part of a series of cases that led to the expansion of the
pervasively regulated industries exception. Not until the 2015 case of City of Los
Angeles v. Patel164 did the Court contract the application of this exception. The
Patel Court struck down a city ordinance allowing law enforcement officers to
inspect a hotel’s guest registry without a warrant.165 The Court held that the
regulation scheme for hotels was not comprehensive enough to qualify under
this exception and was instead more of a general regulation scheme, like a set of
minimum wage laws.166 Again, the Court reiterated the importance of notice—
the regulation scheme must be comprehensive enough to put business-owners
on notice of possible warrantless inspections.167 Notice is important because it
curtails a business-owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
documentation and operation of the business.
Though the pervasively regulated industries exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement is still evolving, the Court has consistently
stressed the importance that both notice and governmental interest, particularly
public safety, play in justifying this exception. The fact that business-owners
entering a particular industry are aware of regulation and inspection schemes
already in place, combined with the important public safety goals that often
underlie these regulation schemes, reduces any claims business-owners have to
an expectation of privacy. This reduction in privacy has led the Court to justify
a warrant exception rooted in a theory of implied consent. In other words, the
reduction in privacy interest is so great in these settings as to be the functional
equivalent of consent. The pervasively regulated industries exception provides
a helpful guidepost for courts evaluating the appropriate relationship between
consent and notice. This Comment now turns to a more comprehensive look at
the role notice plays in consent theory throughout various areas of law.

163

Id. at 703.
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
165
Id. at 2447.
166
Id. at 2455. Barlow’s had already rejected the idea that minimum wage and maximum work hour laws
were enough to qualify a business or industry as “highly regulated.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
314 (1978).
167
Id.
164
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III. THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF NOTICE IN CONSENT THEORY
Nearly all conceptualizations of consent in the legal realm require or assume
that an individual is aware of two things: the fact that she is consenting, and the
things to which she is consenting.168 Because these factors are foundational, any
meaningful theory of implied consent should at the very least require that some
form of notice be given before consent can potentially be implied. It is certainly
necessary, but is it sufficient? It is helpful to analyze the treatment of notice with
respect to consent across various areas of law.
A. Notice in the Private Law Setting: Clickwrap Versus Browsewrap
The explosion of the internet’s role in daily transactions has forced courts to
determine what qualifies as adequate notice to users of a website’s terms and
conditions. There are traditionally two approaches websites use: clickwrap and
browsewrap.169 Clickwrap agreements require a user to click an “I agree” (to the
terms and conditions of the website) button before they can use or browse a
website.170 These agreements have generally received favorable treatment from
courts,171 likely because this approach makes it practically impossible to proceed
using a site without being notified and explicitly consenting to the terms.
Browsewrap agreements also serve to inform users of the terms and
conditions of a website, but these agreements are simply presented to the user
on the page and do not require the user to affirmatively consent to the terms
before using the site.172 “A party instead gives his assent simply by using the
website.”173 Courts have not been as impressed with these types of
agreements.174 The validity of browsewrap agreements “turns on whether a
168
Of course, the purely psychological approach does not require these elements, but that theory does not
appear in the legal context. See Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 36.
169
1 LAW OF THE INTERNET (MB) ch. 1, § 1.03 (2019).
170
Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and
the Reasonably Communicated Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 482 (2002) (“Clickwrap agreements typically
consist of a window containing the terms of the agreement that ‘pops up’ on the computer screen when a user
tries to download or install software. The user has to click on a button labeled ‘I AGREE’ or ‘I ACCEPT’ to
continue.”).
171
1 LAW OF THE INTERNET, supra note 169.
172
Das, supra note 170, at 482 (“Browsewrap agreements appear in the form of a hyperlink on the
vendor’s website. Unlike clickwrap agreements, the terms of a browsewrap agreement are not displayed on the
computer screen unless the user clicks on the hyperlink.”).
173
Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Sep. 12, 2007).
174
See Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *7–
8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (holding that Tickets.com could not be held to terms on a website because “[i]t
cannot be said that merely putting the terms and conditions in this [browsewrap] fashion necessarily creates a
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website user has actual or constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and
conditions prior to using the site.”175 The courts’ treatments of clickwrap versus
browsewrap agreements show a clear preference for affirmative consent as
opposed to simply assuming users are aware of terms that are posted on a site.
B. The Role of Notice in Fourth Amendment Searches
Notice plays a role, albeit an ambiguous one, in the Fourth Amendment
consent doctrine as well. Courts are skeptical of the claim that notice alone can
be sufficient to establish valid implied consent to search. As the court states in
McGann v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp.,176 “there is a
view that the doctrine of implied consent really has little to do with consent as
that term is generally understood, but is in reality a separate exception to the
warrant requirement comparable to the exception for regulatory searches
undertaken for an administrative purpose.”177 McGann,178 a case out of the
Seventh Circuit, addressed the role of notice in the Fourth Amendment consent
search doctrine head on.
McGann involved the search of vehicles parked in a lot displaying a sign
giving notice of potential vehicle searches.179 Plaintiffs, employees of Metra
Rail, parked their cars at Metra’s lot prior to work.180 The lot was fully enclosed
by a fence and had two entrances.181 At each entrance, there was a prominent
sign that read, “VEHICLES ENTERING OR EXITING METRA PROPERTY
ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH BY METRA POLICE.”182 The plaintiffs were
stopped by Metra police officers while leaving the lot, asked to exit their
vehicles, and told by the officers that they had already “submitted to that.”183
There were disputed facts as to the parties’ actual consent when Metra attempted

contract with anyone using the web site”); see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d
Cir. 2002) (holding a browsewrap contract invalid and unenforceable because “a reasonably prudent Internet
user in circumstances such as these would not have known or learned of the existence of the license terms . . . . In
consequence, plaintiffs’ bare act of downloading the software did not unambiguously manifest assent”). But see
Handy v. LogMeIn, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01355-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97021, at *22–23 (E.D. Cal. July 24,
2015) (holding a browsewrap notice provided notice to prospective purchasers of terms of purchase).
175
Southwest Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5.
176
McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R., 8 F.3d 1174 (7th Cir. 1993).
177
Id. at 1181 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
178
Id. at 1174.
179
Id. at 1176.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1177.
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to search their vehicles.184 Metra moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiffs consented to the search by entering the lot with knowledge of the
posted sign.185 The district court granted summary judgment against the
plaintiffs, but did not directly address the validity of the consent based upon the
signage alone.186
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit took up the plaintiff’s argument that the sign
alone was not enough to effectuate the implied consent necessary to conduct the
search.187 In response, Metra directed the court to other cases where courts have
found implied consent where a person “voluntarily undert[ook] conduct which
the person was aware could subject him to a search.”188 The examples Metra
provided were all searches at security checkpoints, which are reasonable
searches pursuant to the administrative search doctrine, not the general consent
exception.189 Metra argued that knowledge of the sign giving notice of potential
search and voluntary conduct subjecting the person to a search were the sole
requirements for a court to imply consent.190
The Seventh Circuit rejected Metra’s argument for two primary reasons:
(1) the protection of the important interests of the Fourth Amendment generally,
and (2) the lack of support for Metra’s argument in either the consent doctrine
or case law. Recognizing its position as a fierce defender of the constitutional
protections granted by the Fourth Amendment,191 the court reiterated its duty to
“guard[] jealously against tactics taken to obtain a person’s consent, and to be
especially wary of those which may appear least objectionable.”192 The court
was particularly concerned about schemes conditioning access to a facility or
service on the waiver of a constitutional right, noting that these schemes
diminish the voluntariness aspect necessary for valid consent.193
184

Id.
Id.
186
Id. at 1176, 1179, 1187–88.
187
Id. at 1181.
188
Id. at 1179.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1180.
192
Id.
193
Id.; cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)
(“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.
It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly over the
view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt.”);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the
185
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In addition to the broader constitutional objections to notice-only implied
consent, the court noted that courts faced with similar issues have looked at a
number of factors, not just notice and voluntary action:
(1) the person searched was on notice that undertaking certain conduct,
like attempting to enter a building or board an airplane, would subject
him to a search, (2) the person voluntarily engaged in the specified
conduct, (3) the search was justified by a vital interest, (4) the search
was reasonably effective in securing the interests at stake, (5) the
search was only as intrusive as necessary to further the interests
justifying the search and (6) the search curtailed, to some extent,
unbridled discretion in the searching officers.194

Essentially, the court is requiring a balancing approach in order to find implied
consent under the Fourth Amendment. Interestingly, while this search is not
discussed in the context of the administrative search doctrine, the factors listed
by the court reflect considerations more akin to those of the pervasively
regulated industries exception. In any case, the court explicitly states that these
factors are not dispositive and should be weighed in each case.195 The McGann
court reversed summary judgment, finding that whether the sign and the
voluntary act were enough to imply consent of the plaintiffs presented a question
of fact for the jury.196
McGann is a prototypical example of a court rejecting the argument that
providing notice, by itself, is sufficient to provide consent under the Fourth
Amendment. However, other circuits have addressed the issue of notice and
consent differently, holding that notice alone did provide the government the
implied consent it needed to search. United States v. Woodrum197 involved the
Boston Police Department’s program, Taxi Inspection Program for Safety
(TIPS), which was designed to increase cab driver safety in the city.198 It allowed
officers to randomly pull over participating taxis to check on their safety.199 This
program provided window decals to taxis of drivers who voluntarily chose to
participate in the program.200 The decals read, in all capital letters, “Public
rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close
and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if
it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”).
194
McGann, 8 F.3d at 1181.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 1186–87.
197
United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
198
Id. at 3–4.
199
Id. at 4.
200
Id.
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Notice: Boston Police Taxi Inspection Program for Safety,” and “This vehicle
may be stopped and visually inspected by the Boston Police at any time to ensure
driver’s safety.”201 The First Circuit held that notice provided by a decal on a
taxicab was sufficient to obtain consent from passengers riding in the cab.202
Interestingly, the court in Woodrum did not use a similar, factors-based totality
of the circumstances approach used in McGann.
When evaluating the validity of the consent, the court analyzed it vis-à-vis
the owner of the cab, the driver of the cab, and the passengers of the cab.
Although this case involved a seizure as opposed to a search,203 the court relied
on case law dealing with searches because the rationale is similar. The court
reasoned that there was valid consent vis-à-vis the owner because he “freely
chose to register for the program of taxi safety stops, and the TIPS decals furnish
tangible proof of this consent. Although the consent was anticipatory and
unparticularized, it was direct.”204 Here, the owner’s voluntary enrollment, along
with the decal on the car providing notice, were enough to effectuate consent to
search the vehicle vis-à-vis the owner of the cab.
The court’s reasoning in finding consent as to the driver, however, is
particularly interesting. Finding that because the owner acted on behalf of both
himself and his employee drivers when signing up for the TIPS program, the
seizure was reasonable.205 To justify this rationale, the court cites Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc.,206 the case rejecting the reasonableness of a warrantless search
under the pervasively regulated industries exception.207 Additionally, the court
noted that the decals provided adequate notice to both the driver and the
passengers that the cab was enrolled in the TIPS program, and thus have
201

Id.
Id. at 11–12. On the night of January 22, 1998, the defendants were passengers in a TIPS cab. The cab
was pulled over, and without a warrant, the passengers were asked to exit the vehicle. Id. at 4. In the course of
exiting the vehicle, a gun fell from one of the passenger’s coats, and a search of the vehicle turned up crack
cocaine, a pipe, a pager, and cash. Id. at 5. The defendant passengers were ultimately charged with felony
possession of a firearm and ammunition and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Id. The defendants
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, but the district court upheld the stop on a couple
grounds, notably, that the TIPS decal provided the consent necessary for the stop and seizure. Id. The defendants
proffered a three-fold argument. First, there was insufficient evidence to establish either the taxi owner’s or taxi
driver’s consent. Id. at 8. Second, the TIPS program is unconstitutional because it conditioned employment on
a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights and does not limit the discretion of the officers making the stops. Id. at
10. Third, even if the TIPS consent legitimizes some stops, the scope of the program does not include this
particular stop because it was not motivated by driver safety. Id. at 8.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 9.
205
Id. at 9–10.
206
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978).
207
Id.
202
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submitted to being stopped and searched.208 In this case, the decal on the taxi
window served as sufficient notice for the court to find implied consent to the
subsequent search by the police.
Another major example of notice playing a fundamental role in garnering
implied consent is one with which many citizens are familiar—the
Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) airport security checkpoint
search.209 Notably, the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that airport
searches are constitutional,210 but it has implied their constitutionality in dicta.211
These searches are justified under the administrative search doctrine,212 which
is largely rooted in public health and safety concerns.213 While public safety
concerns serve as the policy justification for an administrative search, the search
regime itself must still be constitutional. This is where notice comes into play.
As the court explained in United States v. Hartwell,
[T]he entire procedure is rendered less offensive—if not less
intrusive—because air passengers are on notice that they will be
searched. Air passengers choose to fly, and screening procedures of
this kind have existed in every airport in the country since at least
1974. The events of September 11, 2001, have only increased their
prominence in the public’s consciousness. It is inconceivable that
Hartwell was unaware that he had to be searched before he could board
a plane.214

The court easily justified the search in Hartwell under the administrative
search doctrine because it was both based on the need to secure public safety
and provided adequate notice to citizens that a search would occur if they wished
to board a plane. Importantly, the court acknowledged that while some courts
have attempted to justify airport searches on the consent doctrine,215 this
justification is highly illogical.216 In support of this, the court cited Fourth
208

United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2000).
Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening (last visited
Sept. 1, 2020).
210
See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“While the Supreme Court has
not directly spoken on airport administrative searches, it has discussed them in dicta in two cases.”).
211
Id.; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“We reiterate, too, that where the risk to
public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other official
buildings.”).
212
See supra Part II.C.2.
213
Id.
214
Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180–81.
215
See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Edwards,
498 F.2d 496, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mather, 465 F.2d 1035, 1036 (5th Cir. 1972).
216
Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 n.11.
209
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Amendment scholar Wayne R. LaFave’s search and seizure treatise,217 which
explains that “consent theories are ‘basically unsound’ in the airport context
because screening systems rarely meet the requirements for express consent
under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.”218 Bustamonte requires courts to look at the
totality of the circumstances, including whether an individual knew he could
refuse the search, when determining if the obtained consent is valid.219 It is
impossible for a search to be deemed consensual under Bustamonte without an
inquiry into the circumstances of each search.220 Additionally, “an implied
consent analysis merely ‘diverts attention from the more fundamental question
of whether the nature of the regulation undertaken by the government is in fact
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”221 The court intimates that airport
security searches would be unconstitutional based on implied consent and that
their constitutionality rests on the administrative search doctrine alone. The
court’s holdings on airport searches support the idea that notice alone is not
enough to obtain consent under the Fourth Amendment consent doctrine.
An implied consent-based rationale is also used in Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence to secure waiver of a defendant’s Miranda rights.222 The Court
held in Mirada v. Arizona that no custodial interrogations are permitted unless
law enforcement first notifies the arrestee of her Fifth Amendment rights223 and
obtains a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of these rights.224 In
Miranda, Chief Justice Warren made clear that a defendant’s valid waiver must
be express:
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement
and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could
constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply
from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.225

He then quoted a particularly apt passage from Carnley v. Cochran,226 in which
the Court expressly rejected an implied waiver from silence: “Presuming waiver
217
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 10.6(g) at
307–09 (4th ed. 2004).
218
Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 181 n.11.
219
See supra note 93.
220
See supra note 101.
221
Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 181 n.11.
222
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
223
Id. at 444. These rights include the right against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the right
to know that their statements may not be used against them in a court of law. Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 475.
226
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
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from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be
an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not
waiver.”227
However, the standards for obtaining a waiver have been relaxed in
Miranda’s progeny. The first case to recognize an implied waiver to Miranda
was North Carolina v. Butler.228 In Butler, the Court held that silence, combined
with a demonstrated understanding of one’s rights, and behavior that indicates a
willingness to communicate with law enforcement, can serve to effectuate a
Miranda waiver.229 Thirty-one years later, in Berghuis v. Thompkins,230 the
Court further diluted the express waiver requirement by holding that if someone
has full knowledge and understanding of her Miranda rights and chooses not to
invoke them, an implied waiver can be found.231
Despite the changing waiver requirements, one thing remains clear
throughout Miranda jurisprudence: a waiver cannot be effectuated if an arrestee
is not first notified of her rights. In the realm of Miranda, notification of one’s
rights is the threshold inquiry before a court can evaluate whether a suspect
consented to a waiver, either expressly or implicitly. Notification is necessary,
but far from sufficient to render a Miranda waiver valid.
These examples are illustrative of courts’ varying and inconsistent
approaches to the effect of notice on Fourth and Fifth Amendment consent
validity. Part IV argues that notice-based implied consent theories under the
Fourth Amendment should create a rebuttable presumption of
unconstitutionality.
IV. WHY NOTICE ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO EFFECTUATE VALID
IMPLIED CONSENT
Our world is changing in ways that seriously compromise our reasonable
expectations of privacy. The rapidity with which technology is developing and
being deployed by both private and public entities has serious consequences for
how we understand our privacy rights; it has caused us to question what is truly
private anymore. Though we have always interacted in public, before cameras,

227
228
229
230
231

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (quoting Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516).
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
Id. at 369.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
Id. at 384.
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facial recognition technology, and biometric data collection, it was a given that
our face, our gait, and the profile of how we moved was observable, but not able
to be tracked, traced, collected, and stored. There was no way to scan a face,
record the data corresponding to the contours of one’s eyes, nose, mouth, and
bone structure with mathematical certainty, and then store that data in such a
way that it could be used to identify that person in the future. However, this is
now our reality.232 Larger normative and policy questions implicated by the
drastic increase in surveillance and use of tracking technology are important to
grapple with, but they are beyond the scope of this Comment. Surveillance
technology is deployed all around us, often without our knowledge and certainly
without our consent.
These technologies have permeated our world and, at least early on in their
inception, flew completely under the legal radar. However, since the use of these
technologies is now ubiquitous, the law is being forced to catch up. Concerned
citizens and legislatures have only recently begun developing laws to regulate
the use of biometric data collection.233 Naturally, considerations of the Fourth
Amendment and expectations of privacy are essential to the development of
these laws. At the heart of the debate is our understanding of implied consent
within the Fourth Amendment, and particularly the role notice plays in this strain
of jurisprudence. Despite both public and private entities’ attempts to legitimize
their collection of data using notice to imply consent, this understanding is
fundamentally at odds with both philosophical and legal conceptions of implied
consent.
While technology presents the current threat, government efforts to use
notice to vitiate Fourth Amendment protections is not a new threat. Justice
Thurgood Marshall expressed concern in his 1979 dissent in Smith v.
Maryland,234 worrying about allowing “the government to define the scope of
Fourth Amendment protections.”235 He pointed specifically to the example of
“law enforcement officials, simply by announcing their intent to monitor the
content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone conversations,
could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such

232
See generally Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV.
773, 818–25 (2015) (“[N]either preexisting statutory frameworks (e.g., surveillance and privacy statutes) nor
constitutional frameworks (e.g., current Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence), are likely to operate to
protect against the new types of surveillance harms implicated by emerging biometric data tracking
technologies.”).
233
See supra note 22.
234
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235
Id.
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communications.”236 His fear was not in vain. As this Comment has discussed,
two uses of personal data collection—biometric data collection and breath
testing—and one much more rudimentary instance—tire chalking—provide
dangerous examples of the government’s attempt to use notice alone to imply
consent to searches. Regardless of their notice schemes, none of these examples
should be constitutional under a theory of consent.
First is the combination of Denver Police Department’s surveillance system,
HALO, and Morpho Argus, a technology that captures, scans, and stores faces
picked up by surveillance footage.237 While Denver has not yet merged the
HALO system with Morpho Argus, the Colorado Bureau of Investigations has
confirmed its intention to do so.238 This will transform the HALO system from
one of pure surveillance to one of data capturing and searching, triggering Fourth
Amendment concerns. Notably, Colorado does not have any laws regulating the
use of facial recognition technology.239 Throughout Denver, there are signs
notifying citizens that HALO cameras are in use.240
The second example raising concern is new parking enforcement practices
in Bristol, Tennessee, where law enforcement is attempting to glean consent to
search from notice alone. After the Sixth Circuit held that tire chalking is a
search under the Fourth Amendment, Bristol posted signs stating that if one
parks in a public spot, she is deemed to have consented to a search for the
purposes of parking enforcement.241 Although the dangers that stem from a tire
chalking search seem far less serious than storing biometric data, the principles
of the Fourth Amendment’s consent doctrine are offended nonetheless. Finally,
DUI implied consent laws claim to secure drivers’ consent from notice provided
via statute. The act of procuring a driver’s license serves as the necessary “act”
to trigger the implication of consent, regardless of whether one is actually aware
of the statute or that she is consenting.
In all three of these examples, the state is attempting to gain consent to search
based exclusively on notice. If challenged, the state’s justification would
presumably be that the signage provided notice, and that by engaging in the
specified act, the individual consented to the terms of the search. And yet, under
236

Id.
See Robertson, supra note 5.
238
Id.
239
But see Esteban Hernandez, A Proposed Denver Law Would Ban Police from Using Facial Recognition
Technology, DENVERITE (Sept. 4, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://denverite.com/2019/09/04/a-potential-denver-lawwould-ban-law-enforcement-from-using-facial-recognition-technology/.
240
Facial Recognition Technology: Does It Violate Privacy or Protect Community?, supra note 11.
241
Lipton, supra note 7.
237
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either the general consent exception or the pervasively regulated industries
exception to the Fourth Amendment, notice alone is not enough to imply consent
as it does not meet the requirements of either framework.
A. Notice and the General Consent Exception
Under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement,
in determining whether officers obtained valid consent to search, courts look to
indication, authority, voluntariness, and scope.242 Additionally, valid consent
must be revocable243 and is assessed based on the totality of the
circumstances.244 Laws attempting to use notice alone to obtain consent do not
meet these requirements for five especially salient reasons.
First, when the state uses notice alone, particularly through posting a sign
specifying that performing a certain act will result in consent to a particular
thing, there is likely not the necessary indication required by the consent
doctrine. While indication can be a low bar, it almost always requires some level
of affirmative action in response to the attempt to acquire consent.245 For
example, when X is asked by officers if they can search her home, an affirmative
nod or the act of stepping aside and gesturing into the home would be considered
indication of consent.246 However, actions in response to a posted sign assuming
consent based on that specified action cannot absolutely and necessarily be
considered an indication of consent. For example, in the case of a parking sign
stating that by parking in public spots, one consents to her tires being chalked,
an individual who did not see the sign but parked in the spot cannot be said to
have indicated consent; she was utterly unaware of the state’s attempt to gain
her consent in the first place. Someone who did see the sign and parked in the
spot can arguably be perceived as indicating consent, but the sign along with the
specified action cannot automatically serve as indication of consent. The attempt
to garner consent from the HALO camera “warnings” is even more indefensible.
Since these cameras will be gathering the data of those present in public
spaces,247 there is certainly no act that can qualify as granting consent. Simply
being present in a public space makes no affirmative statement regarding

242

See supra Part II.C.1.a.
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991).
244
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
245
See supra note 84.
246
United States v. Faler, 832 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding implied consent where the officer
asked, “mind if we come in?”, and in response the apartment tenant “opened the door wider, moved out of the
way, and the officers entered”).
247
Const. Project’s Task Force on Facial Recognition Surveillance & Jake Laperruque, supra note 15.
243
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consent to search and gather data. As to DUI implied consent laws, the “notice”
is provided through statute.248 There can be no behavior indicating consent if
someone is not aware of the statute in the first place, and thus, completely
unaware that her procurement of a driver’s license is serving as indication of
consent.
Second, the voluntariness requirement poses an impossible hurdle to
governments hoping to effectuate consent from notice alone. Voluntariness is
the philosophical bedrock of consent and as such, “obstacles to voluntary choice,
if inexorable, will compromise the usefulness of consent theory as a descriptive
map and normative guide.”249 In the Fourth Amendment context, we know that
voluntary consent does not require the government to inform an individual of
her right to refuse; rather, knowledge of the right to refuse is just one factor in
the totality of circumstances analysis.250 Additionally, Carpenter tells us that
performing acts that are innocent and largely inescapable in modern life, like
owning and using a cell phone, will likely not be considered voluntary.251 While
these fundamental acts are performed voluntarily in the philosophical sense, it
is dishonest and disingenuous to suggest that their performance amounts to
voluntary consent.
Whether specific acts are considered an inescapable part of modern life is
certainly debatable, and parking in public spaces, for example, toes the line. On
the one hand, the ability to park publicly on the city streets is an inescapable part
of modern life, especially in commuter-heavy cities. It enables residents to use
the streets for which their tax dollars pay, to run necessary errands, to patronize
community businesses, and to engage with fellow citizens in the public square.
On the other hand, the ability to use public transportation or to park in private
lots makes parking publicly less “inescapable.” Ultimately, public parking is
more akin to the use of a cellphone—while its use is not absolutely necessary to
survive, it is so convenient and common as to be virtually necessary to function
effectively in society.
While conditioning parking on consent is debatably voluntary, implying
consent to gather one’s biometric data in public places based on notice via a
posted sign certainly is not. Imagine, for example, someone walking to the
grocery store or the Department of Motor Vehicles on the public streets. She
looks up and sees a sign reading, “Attention: By being present on these streets,
248
249
250
251

Voas, supra note 20.
Herzog, supra note 35, at 1674.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1973).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
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you are consenting to the collection of your biometric data.” The use of public
streets and spaces is certainly an inescapable, necessary part of modern life.
There is also no realistic way to hide the majority of one’s biometric data—
wearing a mask or changing one’s gait is not a realistic alternative to exposing
one’s biometric data publicly. Therefore, implying consent based on presence in
public is not valid because it is not truly voluntary.
DUI implied consent laws raise interesting questions of voluntariness. In
fact, much ink has been spilled over the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
which holds that “[the] government may not grant a benefit on the condition that
the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
withhold that benefit altogether.”252 Conditioning a driver’s license, a necessity
to modern life, on the surrender of Fourth Amendment rights vitiates any
legitimate claim to voluntariness. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to hold
these statutes constitutional.253 In all three recent implied consent law cases, the
Court has refused to validate the searches on implied consent grounds, despite
the implied consent statutes in place.254
The third reason that notice alone is insufficient to validate a search on
consent grounds is that implying consent through notice is not revocable. As the
Court stated in Jardines, implied licenses (which are the functional equivalent
of implied consent) must be revocable.255 While there is debate about what
serves as successful revocation of the implied license,256 the ability to revoke is
necessary. In the parking example, an individual could possibly revoke the
implied consent by placing a sign on her car expressly revoking any consent the
city attempts to garner.257 In the biometric data collection case, there is no ability
to revoke. While the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to notify an
individual of her right to revoke consent, some state constitutions do require
such notification before consent to search can be obtained.258 Revocability is a
252
Sullivan, supra note 193 (“It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly
what it may not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to
impose a condition on its receipt.”).
253
See supra Part II.C.1.e.
254
See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 164 (2013) (holding unconstitutional a forcible, warrantless
blood test despite the state’s implied consent laws); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (2016)
(holding a blood test unconstitutional pursuant to the arrest of the individual, despite implied consent laws);
Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2526 (2019) (finding a blood test of an unconscious driver constitutional
based on the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment, not implied consent).
255
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013).
256
See supra note 125.
257
For an interesting and entertaining look at an operationalized attempt to help individuals revoke
consent, see FOURTH AMEND. SEC., https://fourthamendmentsecurity.com.
258
Fern Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and Talk Visits
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crucial feature of valid implied consent since it rests on the idea of a voluntary
choice and a communicated mental state. A person can change her mind, and
once the mind has been changed and that has been communicated, there is no
longer the consent necessary to premise a search on consent. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit has held that consent is no longer valid when officers interfere with a
suspect’s ability to revoke her consent.259 Consequently, the impossibility of
revoking consent in searches premised on notice deems implied consent an
invalid theory.
Scope presents a fourth hurdle to using notice alone to unequivocally imply
consent. Because consenters can set the scope of the search to which they are
consenting,260 it is doctrinally unsound to force a uniform scope of consent upon
each consenter. For example, one can consent to a search of her kitchen and
living space, but not her bedroom. The parking example is largely about the
scope of the license a motorist gives parking enforcement to monitor her car
while parked. Under Jardines, it is possible that a court would reject a theory of
implied consent in this situation because there is “no customary invitation”261 to
allow officers to chalk car tires. The question then becomes whether the city can
change the nature of the driver’s implied license by posting a sign. If a court
answered this question in the affirmative, it would be saying that the state can
turn a trespass search into a reasonable search by virtue of a posted sign. This
approach is fundamentally contrary to the reasoning in Jardines and Jimeno,
which both focus on the implied license stemming from expectations of how
everyday citizens, not law enforcement, interact with each other.262
Additionally, this is exactly the type of state action Justice Marshall warned
against in Smith v. Maryland.263 An implied license cannot extend to law
enforcement only, so, although narrow in the parking context, a sign cannot
create an implied license that extends to officers only.
Implied licenses extending identically to public and private entities is an
approach supported by William Baude and James Stern in their article, The

Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515 (2006).
259
See United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1036–37 (holding that if the officers coerced
defendants into believing that they did not have the ability to withdraw their consent to the search, this was a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights).
260
See supra Part II.C.1.d.
261
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 2 (2013).
262
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 1–2; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249–51 (1991).
263
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[L]aw enforcement officials,
simply by announcing their intent to monitor the content of random samples of first-class mail or private phone
conversations, could put the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such
communications.”).
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Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment.264 Baude and Stern argue for an
entirely new approach to the Fourth Amendment265 that does not look to privacy
as the source of Fourth Amendment protection, but rather looks to citizens’
expectations of privacy based exclusively on protections derived from private
law.266 According to Baude and Stern,
Instead of making Fourth Amendment protection hinge on whether it
is “reasonable” to expect privacy in a given situation, a court should
ask whether government officials have engaged in an investigative act
that would be unlawful for a similarly situated private actor to perform.
That is, stripped of official authority, has the government actor done
something that would be tortious, criminal, or otherwise a violation of
some legal duty? Fourth Amendment protection, in other words, is
warranted when government officials either violate generally
applicable law or avail themselves of a governmental exemption from
it.267

Under the positive law model, the parking signs, the biometric datagathering, and DUI implied consent laws would violate Fourth Amendment
protection. In all three of these cases, the government is far exceeding the scope
of what is legal for an ordinary citizen to do without a warrant, and according to
Baude and Stern, that is the linchpin for valid searches under the Fourth
Amendment.268
The fifth problem with gleaning consent based on notice alone is the court’s
insistence on evaluating consent based on the totality of the circumstances.269
Evaluating consent individually in each case and on the totality of the
circumstances creates an important bulwark against the all-powerful state. The
courts recognize time and again that the particular circumstances under which
an individual consents to law enforcement requests are crucially important to the
validity of the consent itself.270 The McGann Court named seven factors

264
William Baude & James Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1821, 1823 (2016).
265
Id. at 1825.
266
Id. at 1823 (“In short, Fourth Amendment protection should depend on property law, privacy torts,
consumer laws, eavesdropping and wiretapping legislation, anti-stalking statutes, and other provisions of law
generally applicable to private actors, rather than a freestanding doctrine of privacy fashioned by courts on the
fly.”).
267
Id. at 1825–26 (2016).
268
Id.
269
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 218 (1973); McGann v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R.,
8 F.3d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1993).
270
See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 218; McGann, 8 F.3d at 1178.
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specifically,271 but the crucial holding was that each factor needs to be assessed
in each case—no one factor is dispositive in finding implied consent. If the state
were to try and imply consent based off of a sign alone, this would violate
precedent and completely vitiate the individual inquiry based on the totality of
the circumstances requirement. Courts finding that notice alone suffices to imply
consent could allow the government to engage in extremely bold invasions of
privacy, all premised on a simple sign posted in public areas.
Claiming that notice alone effectuates implied consent without any further
inquiry into the individual circumstances of a case is nothing short of pure
“fiction.”272 The most obvious example highlighting the importance of
individual inquiry is an instance where someone did not see a posted sign, either
because she was distracted or because she could not see. If the court were to
adopt the government’s implied consent theory, a sign alone would trigger her
“consent” to the specified action, despite her having absolutely no idea that she
had “consented.” While this is only one example, there are many potential
instances where notice might not have actually served its purpose in notifying;
thus, implying consent premised on the notice and nothing more is absurd.
Notice cannot provide blanket consent and eliminate the need for courts to
engage in an individual inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances.
B. Notice and the Administrative Search and Pervasively Regulated Industries
Exceptions
A second route by which the government could attempt to justify notice
alone serving to effectuate implied consent is through the administrative search
and pervasively regulated industries exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.
These exceptions apply to both government and commercial entities with a
history of regulation, a consistency of regulation, and engagement in work with
an important public health and safety component.273 Analyzing these exceptions
highlights important differences between the parking sign example, the
biometric data-gathering example, and DUI consent laws. Taking the parking
sign and biometric data-gathering examples together, they simply do not meet
271
McGann, 8 F.3d at 1181 (holding that “[g]enerally, in deciding whether to uphold a warrantless search
on the basis of implied consent, courts consider whether (1) the person searched was on notice that undertaking
certain conduct, like attempting to enter a building or board an airplane, would subject him to a search, (2) the
person voluntarily engaged in the specified conduct, (3) the search was justified by a vital interest, (4) the search
was reasonably effective in securing the interests at stake, (5) the search was only as intrusive as necessary to
further the interests justifying the search[,] and (6) the search curtailed, to some extent, unbridled discretion in
the searching officers”).
272
See supra note 133.
273
See supra text accompanying notes 135–42.
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the requirements of these exceptions. While there is arguably a history of
regulation when it comes to monitoring cars for parking enforcement, the same
cannot be said of collecting and storing biometric data. And while the biometric
data gathering might be consistent, the same cannot be said of parking
enforcement searches. Finally, neither of these searches is premised on the
triggering rationale: furthering health and public safety.274 It is difficult to
imagine a situation where parking enforcement poses enough of a threat to
public safety that courts would consider it under these exceptions. Additionally,
while gathering biometric data could be justified as a means of securing public
safety, the method by which these systems work casts much too wide a net.
These doctrines apply to business-owners and government entities performing
very particular searches.275 It does not apply to broad and general law
enforcement searches for safety purposes. In fact, these types of searches are
exactly the searches from which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect
against.
DUI implied consent laws, on the other hand, force uniform consent upon
any individual that obtains a driver’s license. While these searches meet the
history of search, consistency of search, and public safety requirements of the
administrative search and pervasively regulated industries exceptions, they are
conducted by law enforcement officers for criminal enforcement purposes.
These factors are threshold requirements for these exceptions. Additionally, and
most importantly for the purposes of this Comment, DUI implied consent laws
do not provide the necessary notice. If a driver’s license applicant is not aware
of the statute, the idea that her procurement of the license indicated her consent
is entirely fictitious. These three examples demonstrate why notice alone cannot
serve to garner the consent necessary to search under the Fourth Amendment,
using neither the theory of consent nor administrative search. However, this
Comment argues that a consent theory may be justified if the state meets a robust
set of requirements, including meaningful notice.

274
Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2019). Notably, Saginaw tried to argue that
parking poses a threat to public safety, but this argument was vehemently rejected by the Sixth Circuit. “[O]n
these facts, the City fails to demonstrate how this search bears a relation to public safety. The City does not show
that the location or length of time that Taylor’s vehicle was parked created the type of ‘hazard’ or traffic
impediment amounting to a public safety concern. Nor does the City demonstrate that delaying a search would
result in injury or ongoing harm to the community . . . . No similar ongoing public disturbance exists here to
justify a warrantless search.” Id.
275
See supra text accompanying notes 135–38.
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V. DRAWING THE LINE: WHEN IS NOTICE “ENOUGH?”
This Comment does not suggest that there are absolutely no circumstances
under which the state can use notice to generate implied consent. Rather, it
argues that those circumstances should be extremely limited, and a court should
be highly suspicious and skeptical toward the state’s attempts to use a noticebased implied consent rationale. Courts should be wary of attempts to expand
any warrant exception when the justification is based on notice effectuating
implied consent. Notice should be enough to effectuate implied consent in an
extremely limited set of circumstances. Borrowing from the pervasively
regulated industries exception, four elements should each be met before a court
finds notice alone sufficient to generate implied consent: tradition of search,
consistency of search, revocability of consent, and most importantly, furthering
of public safety. In fact, when accompanied by these four elements, the notice
itself simply ensures individuals are aware of an already robust search scheme.
First, courts should look for a tradition or history of search. A tradition of a
particular search taking place creates an expectation for future individuals that,
in a particular situation, a search will take place. This expectation allows
individuals to conform their behavior to those expectations. Knowing one is
likely going to be subjected to a search changes one’s expectations of privacy.
In other words, it reduces our expectation of privacy in that situation, which is a
key inquiry when evaluating the reasonableness of a search. A lesser expectation
of privacy makes a search more likely to be reasonable, or, not a search at all.276
Second, a search scheme should be highly consistent for notice to be an
effective form of garnering implied consent. Consistency is a hallmark of the
pervasively regulated industries exception. If a search is conducted in a highly
regular, predictable fashion, it will reduce an individual’s expectations of
privacy in that particular situation. Consistency and regularity eliminate
uncertainty. For example, if a search scheme is in place, but rarely enforced, it
may not actually reduce an individual’s expectation of privacy because it is
natural to assume that a search will not actually take place. However, if every
single time one subjects herself to the situation in which the search scheme is in
place, the search actually takes place, then one’s expectation of privacy is
necessarily reduced. She knows, with certainty, that that situation will lead to a
search. Such predictability, combined with an individual voluntarily subjecting

276
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 207 (1986).
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herself to the particular situation, eliminates any claim that individual may have
had to her privacy.
Third, the implied consent must be revocable. Because the scope of the
search must be able to be limited by the consenter, the consenter must be aware
of the exact circumstances under which the search will occur to be able to
properly consent and to potentially revoke consent to a search. Therefore, notice
cannot claim to effectuate implied consent to a search that is not imminent. This
is one reason DUI implied consent laws should be void. A statute claiming to
imply consent to a breathalyzer in exchange for a driver’s license is too
attenuated to the actual search, should it ever even occur. These statutes also
frequently impose criminal sanctions for revoking the implied consent.277
Imposing criminal sanctions as a punishment for revocation renders this
“consent” practically and functionally irrevocable. It strains credulity to claim
that one can truly revoke her consent if that revocation comes with criminal
sanctions, including potential jail time.
Fourth, and most importantly, a search scheme attempting to use notice to
garner implied consent must be rooted in legitimate and specific public safety
goals. The government, and law enforcement officials specifically, bear the
burden of protecting the public and controlling crime. On the one hand, safe
environments allow cities and their citizens to flourish. On the other hand,
officers’ pursuit of public safety goals is constrained by citizens’ right to privacy
and non-interference in their daily lives. This balance is at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment. Law enforcement officers are at their peak power when taking
actions objectively aimed at maintaining public safety.278 This is the essence of
their purpose. In fact, many campus police forces are referred to as
“Department(s) of Public Safety.” Regardless of how traditional or predictable
a search scheme is, if it is not designed to further public safety, then it simply
cannot be important enough to compromise the protections guaranteed to us by
the Fourth Amendment.279

277
See Refusing to Take a Breathalyzer Test, ALCOHOL.ORG, https://www.alcohol.org/dui/breathalyzer/
(“Laws still vary greatly by state. In some states, refusing a [portable breathalyzer test] is a misdemeanor that is
punishable by a fine and/or up to 90 days in jail.”).
278
Jeremiah Mosteller, The Role of Police in America, CHARLES KOCH INST., https://www.
charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-policing-reform/role-of-police-in-america/ (“The purpose
of law enforcement in a free society is to promote public safety and uphold the rule of law so that individual
liberty may flourish.”).
279
In Taylor v. City of Saginaw, the government argued that enforcing parking limits was a public safety
goal. See 922 F.3d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 2019). “Not only does this regulation facilitate convenience for City drivers,
it also promotes public safety through the orderly movement and parking of traffic (among numerous other
significant purposes).” Defendants-Appellees’ Brief on Appeal at 16, Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 22 F.3d 328
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A prime example of when signs provide the robust notice to effectuate
implied consent is in the airport search context. As we enter the airport, we
immediately see signs directing us toward security checkpoints. While waiting
in line to pass through security, we see TSA signs notifying us that a search will
be conducted. Additionally, the forthcoming search is not a surprise. Why?
Security searches at airports have been in place for decades.280 We have
encountered them since we were children, seen them portrayed on television
shows, or discussed on the news. We know that buying a plane ticket will subject
us to a particular TSA search. These searches are consistent and predictable. No
one is immune from search and the searches are not waivable. TSA conducts a
search of each and every individual, every single time she boards a commercial
flight. The tradition and consistency of search make the notification signage
almost superfluous. Further, commercial flight poses uniquely grave public
safety threats. Flights carry hundreds of passengers, through the air for
thousands of miles, siloed off from police officers and offering no escape to
passengers, should something go wrong. The safety stakes are about as high as
they get, and enforcing public safety via a traditional, predictable, consistent
search is necessary. The notice of search given to passengers prior to security
checkpoints meets the requirements proposed by this Comment to effectuate
valid implied consent to search under the Fourth Amendment. In a situation that
does not meet all four requirements, the government cannot conduct a search
pursuant to the consent exception, regardless of notice or signage claiming to
effectuate implied consent.
CONCLUSION
Consent is a concept as old as time. Granting permission for others to act
toward you in a particular way is not a new rationale, nor is it philosophically
distinct in the Fourth Amendment context. However, because of the power
dynamic between citizens and the state, it is imperative that society and the
courts protect against the state’s abuse of its power in an effort to garner consent,
specifically implied consent. This Comment argues that notice alone,
particularly through the use of signage, creates a rebuttable presumption against
courts finding valid implied consent under the Fourth Amendment. The state

(6th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-2126). However, this is an objective inquiry that was rejected by the Sixth Circuit.
Taylor, 922 F.3d at 335.
280
While there was a dramatic increase in flight security in terms of both invasiveness and frequency of
search after the September 11, 2001 attacks, there was some form of passenger searches, although less
consistently than today, since the 1970’s. See Bryan Gardiner, Off with Your Shoes: A Brief History of Airport
Security, WIRED (June 14, 2013, 6:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/fa_planehijackings/.
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cannot claim to make an unconstitutional search constitutional simply by
declaring it to be so.
As technology rapidly advances, it becomes increasingly important to
regulate the circumstances under which we allow the government to track,
monitor, and collect our personal information. Yet the government’s attempt to
use signage alone to effectuate consent is not isolated to the technological
sphere: as the City of Bristol’s response to the tire-chalking case demonstrates,
states are capable of using their unique power to create implied consent in
myriad situations. In fact, DUI implied consent laws are the most common use
of this method of creating implied consent to search. However, there is no
warrant exception that justifies this method of garnering consent—not the
general consent exception, nor the administrative search exception, nor the
pervasively regulated industries exception. Courts should remain wary of this
potential abuse of government power and strike down alleged implied consentbased Fourth Amendment searches when notice alone is the foundation on which
the “consent” rests. However, when the government’s search scheme creates
robust notice—including a history of search, consistency of search, the ability
to revoke consent, and the furthering of public safety goals—courts should be
willing to entertain an argument that the notice, particularly via signage, created
the necessary implied consent to justify a warrantless search. Only then can the
Fourth Amendment continue to be the bulwark against abuse of state power,
large or small, that it was intended to be.
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